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Abstract 
The paper estimates and compares cost efficiency of domestic and foreign banks in Thailand by using 
bank-panel data between 1995 and 2003. It also examines the effect of foreign bank entry on banking 
efficiency in Thailand since the significant acquisitions by foreign banks after the 1997 financial crisis. 
The widely used translog functional form specification is statistically tested by pooled regressions. The 
estimated results suggest that the unit costs of production of domestic and foreign banks are 
indistinguishable, although the two types of banks focus on different areas of the banking business. The 
findings suggest that based on bank operating efficiency, if foreign banks represent the best-practice banks 
in the industry, to a large extent, domestic banks in Thailand have caught up to the best-practice standards 
throughout 1995-2003, significantly after the 1997 financial crisis . This may be due to greater foreign 
participation through acquisitions, which increases the competitive pressure in the banking industry, and 
also to financial restructuring of domestic banks, which increases the cost efficiency of domestic banks, 
thereby benefiting banking customers. 
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1. Introduction  
Thailand experienced massive changes since the 1997 Twin crisis, the worst recorded in its 
economic history. After 10 years (1987-1996) of stable and rapid economic and financial 
development, in 1997 the Thai economy experienced a severe twin crisis, which is a 
simultaneous crisis in the balance of payments and in the banking system (Glick and Hutchison, 
1999 and Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999). There is a close link between a country’s currency 
stability and the health of its banking sector. Devaluation negatively affects the balance sheets of 
financial intermediaries, which leads to a tightening in credit market conditions and possibly to a 
contraction in output. In addition, the adverse effects of devaluation are worse if banks’ balance 
sheets are deteriorated by non-performing loans (NPLs), or if banks borrow heavily in foreign 
currencies, particularly short term. As a result, banking and currency crises can amplify each 
other and generate a vicious circle (Pesenti and Tille, 2000 and Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999). 
Before the onset of the 1997 Twin crisis, Thailand’s banks were regarded as a positive 
element in the economy, and Thailand was classified as one of the group of the ‘East Asian 
miracle’ countries which had notably improved in total factor productivity (World Bank, 1993). 
Although banks in emerging economies are weaker than those in industrialised countries, in 
terms of capital base, performance and regulations, it does not seem likely that they are 
inefficient in resource management (Bhagwati, 2002 and Menkhoff and Suwanaporn, 2003). 
Thai banks have not performed worse than any other bank in other countries, both in terms of 
allocative efficiency and operational efficiency (Menkhoff and Suwanaporn, 2003). However, it 
seems that a large number of Thai financial institutions were distressed by the first half of 1997. 
What went wrong in the Thai banking sector and made the positive performance disappear 
within a few years? One possible answer to this question is that financial liberalisation was 
rushed and the authorities did not pay sufficient attention to the fact that the capital market is not 
as safe as the goods market (Bhagwati, 2002).  
Currency and banking crises are not a new episode. International economic crises will 
probably continue to occur in the future as they have for centuries. Emerging market countries 
which want to avoid the devasting effects of such crises should create efficient early warning 
systems, associated with standard country surveillance, reduce the vulnerability of their 
economies by getting macroeconomic policies right, and create sound banking, increasing 
international liquidity and shifting toward risk-based incentives to supervision regulations 
(Feldstein, 1999 and 2000 and Kawai et al, 2001). 
After the crisis, Thailand has complied with most of the policy changes agreed with the IMF 
in the context of the 1997 rescue program. However, distressed assets of both the corporate 
sector and its financial sector counterpart have remained high. Because of the large debt 
overhang, the financial sector has not fully played its role as financial intermediary in facilitating 
sustained economic growth. Also, the credit channel of monetary policy transmission was 
impaired after the crisis.  Hence, a close examination of bank performance, in particular in 
different groups of banks, is important for research and policy. This will contribute to handling 
and preventing crises and will be of use also for policy making relating to banking competition. 
From a historical point of view, banking has been a heavily regulated industry in most 
countries. Consequently, the interest in studying bank efficiency and changes therein stems from 
a desire to know how deregulation and liberalisation affects the industry. For instance, in the US 
there used to be regulations which restricted banks in their ability to open branches outside their 
home state and regulations restricting commercial banks in their ability to enter investment 
banking etc. Early studies on banking efficiency for instance suggested that the minimum   4 
efficient scale for banks is fairly large; this implied that regulations which prevented banks from 
operating outside their home state often forced banks to operate below efficient scale, and that 
deregulation would improve efficiency. Recent studies tried to check whether deregulation did 
increase competition and improve efficiency. Similar efforts have been made to examine 
whether increases in foreign bank participation when markets were liberalized would increase 
competition and efficiency (Berger and Mester, 1997, Berger and Humphrey, 1997, Goldberg et 
al, 2000, Clarke et. al, 2001, Sturm and Williams, 2004 and Detragiache and Gupta, 2004). 
Banking efficiency research has been conducted extensively for U.S. commercial banks, to a 
smaller extent for European financial institutions and relatively little for Asian financial 
institutions (Kwan, 2003 and Berger and Hamphrey, 1997).  There have also been only few 
studies comparing efficiency between domestic and foreign banks in one country.  
Bank efficiency studies can be classified into those which examine scale and scope 
efficiency alone, and those which also examine X -efficiency
1. Most studies focus on scale and 
scope efficiency. The scale and scope studies estimate an average practice cost function which 
explains bank cost to output levels and input prices. The technique fundamentally assumes that 
there is no X -inefficiency and banks use the same production technology. In this setting, 
inefficiently high costs can arise if banks fail to operate at the efficient scale, or if they fail to 
operate with efficient scope, i.e. with an efficient output mix. On the other hand, X -efficiency 
studies estimate a best practice cost function, which represents the predicted cost function of 
banks that are X-efficient, and then assesses the degree of inefficiency of banks in the sample 
relative to this best practice technology
2 (Mester, 1996). Hence in addition to the above sources 
of inefficiency, inefficiently high costs can arise in this setting also from banks failing to use the 
efficient production technology or input mix. The present study focuses on X - efficiency and 
compares domestic and foreign banks in Thailand. 
Instead of via the cost function, scale, scope or X efficiency can in principle also be 
measured via the profit function. The reasons why most studies, including the present one, focus 
on cost efficiency can be classified into three main categories as asserted by Fries and Taci 
(2004) as follows. Firstly, stronger relative cost efficiency mostly comes along with the 
structural and institutional reforms. Secondly, greater cost efficiency or efficiency gains decrease 
the operating costs in both operations of payments systems and intermediation of savings into 
investments, which finally benefit the overall economic development. Thirdly, cost efficiency 
may be an advantage for other dimensions of b ank performance which contribute to overall 
economic development, for instance, the identification of more productive lending opportunities. 
In addition, cost efficiency is one of the three common performance dimensions (the other two 
are capital adequacy and loan management) for identifying problem banks (Rahman et al, 2004). 
Recently, the Bank of Thailand imposed the Financial Sector Master Plan, aiming at 
improving efficiency, stability and competition in the financial system and broadening 
accessibility of financial services to all potential users. In order to realise greater efficiency and 
less duplication of functions, under the restructuring the Thai financial institutions, there will be 
two types of licences to financial institutions that take deposits from the public: commercial 
                                                  
1 Scale efficiency – whether banks are operating with the efficiency level of outputs; scope efficiency – 
whether banks are operating with the efficiency mix of outputs; and X-efficiency – whether banks are 
using their inputs efficiently (Mester, 1996, pp. 1026). 
2 Three common methodologies are data envelopment analysis (DEA), thick frontier analysis, and 
stochastic econometric cost frontier analysis. None of these methodologies work without problems. 
(Mester, 1996).   5 
banks and retail banks
3. Whereas under the restructuring of foreign-owned financial institutions, 
there will be two types of foreign bank licenses: subsidiaries of foreign banks and full branches 
of foreign banks (BOT, 2004). In all, the study of cost efficiency of banks will enable policy 
makers to pinpoint current infrastructure weaknesses and promptly issue appropriate policy 
measures to cure such conditions. 
The purposes of this paper are as follows:  
1) To analyse the development of per unit operating costs of the banking industry in 
Thailand and to compare the cost efficiency of domestic and foreign banks in order to shed light 
on the cost advantages (if any) of foreign banks. The findings will have implications for 
regulatory policies relating to the size and competitiveness of domestic banks and foreign bank 
entry. 
2) To examine the choice of input combination, for example, the combination of labour and 
physical capital in banking production across the different types of banks.  
3) To investigate the effect of foreign bank entry on banking efficiency in Thailand after the 
significant acquisitions by banks from developed countries in 1999.  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides an institutional background. 
Section 3 presents a review of the literature. Section 4 discusses the data and descriptive analysis 
and the methodology. Section 5 shows the analysis of empirical results and section 6 provides 
concluding remarks. 
2. Institutional Background 
2.1 The Development of the Thai Banking Industry 
Thailand’s financial system is deep compared to other emerging market economies with 
similar per capita income. In fact, at the end-2002, total financial assets stood at about 158 
percent of GDP (IMF, 2004). Most of the financial deepening took place at the beginning of the 
1980s and was mainly due to an increasingly large share of private savings which was 
channelled into accumulation of financial assets. The Thai system is bank-oriented with limited 
financia l intermediation through mutual funds and other type of institutional investors (Alba et 
al., 1999).  
Thailand’s financial system includes four main constituents: commercial banks, capital 
markets (consisting of both stock and bond markets), government-owned specialised financial 
institutions (SFIs) and non-bank financial intermediaries (finance companies, credit foncier 
companies, life insurance companies, and various financial co-operatives). Commercial banks 
are the oldest and largest part of the Thai financial system (Disyatat and Nakornthab, 2003) (see 
table 9). Thailand’s banking industry is characterised by an oligopolistic market structure. It 
seems that this oligopolistic structure and the lack of a threat of new entry obstructed innovation 
and diversification in the financial system (Alba et al., 1999). At end of 2002, commercial 
banks’ assets stood at 106 percent of GDP (IMF, 2004), compared to  14 percent of GDP in 
1960. 
On the other hand, bonds and stock markets remain in the process of development. The 
value of all bonds outstanding increased from 12 percent of GDP at end-1997 to 42 percent of 
                                                  
3 Commercial banks are banks with qualified and well capitalised and which provide financial services to 
all groups of customers and carry out all types of financial transactions, except insurance underwriting as 
well as brokering, trading and underwriting of equity securities. Retail banks are banks with qualified and 
smaller capital requirement and which offer financial services to retail customers and SMEs subject to 
exposure limits per customer and other conditions set by the BOT (BOT, 2004).   6 
GDP at end-2002. As for Thailand’s main equity market, at peak in 1993 the Stock Exchange of 
Thailand (SET) market capitalisation stood at 105 percent of GDP. However, after the 1997 
financial crisis, the SET market capitalisation has been relatively small despite recent gains, 
compared to other stock exchanges in the region. As of June-2003, the SET market capitalisation 
accounted for 47 percent of GDP (Disyatata and Nakornthab, 2003). 
Finance companies which have rather limited roles
4 tend to seek profits by allocating a 
major share of their portfolio into high risk areas, namely construction and real estate, leasing 
and personal consumption loans because of relative advantages of commercial banks in term of 
cost of funds and regulations (Alba et al., 1999). Finance companies were strongly affected by 
the 1997 financial crisis. At peak at end-1996, finance companies assets stood at about one-third 
of those of commercial banks. Since the financial crisis, the number of finance companies 
decreased from 91 to 19 and their assets accounted for only one-seventh of their assets level in 
1996 (Disyatat and Nakornthab, 2003). 
2.2 Reform of the Thai Banking Sector 
The financial liberalisation which took place in the late 1980s and early 1990s increased 
competition in the financial sector. The financial liberalisation programme had four main 
components: to deregulate the financial system; to develop financial instruments; to improve the 
payments system; and to improve the supervision and examination of financial institutions. The 
three main objectives of the programme were as follows: to increase competition in the domestic 
financial sector with the ultimate goal of improving the efficiency of savings mobilisation and 
credit allocation; to expand the financial sector for supporting economic expansion; and to 
establish Bangkok as the leading offshore financial centre
5 in the region. Financial liberalisation 
was carried out through a series of three-year financial system development plans
6 (Intarachote 
and Williams, 2003). 
                                                  
4 Unlike commercial banks, finance and securities companies are not allowed to take direct deposits from 
the public. They fund their operations primarily through the issuance of promissory notes, credits from 
commercial banks, and funding from other financial institutions respectively. At the same time, like 
commercial banks, the largest share of finance companies’ income comes from lending activities, 
followed by hire purchase business, securities trading, dividends on investments and other sources (Alba 
et al, 1999). 
5 The Bangkok International Banking Facilities (BIBFs) was established in 1993 with an aim of 
simplifying access to international capital in response to the I -S gap. There are two types of BIBF 
transactions. The first is out-out transactions which deal with taking deposits and lending in foreign 
currencies for specific activities overseas. The second is out-in transactions which relate to foreign 
currency borrowings from overseas or other BIBFs, then to be on-lent in foreign currencies to the 
domestic sector. 
6 The first plan (1990-1992) increased competition and efficiency in the banking system which included 
the policies aiming to abolish interest rate restrictions, relaxing capital and foreign exchange controls, and 
extend the activities of banks and other domestic financial institutions. The second plan (1993-1995) 
enhanced savings mobilisation, expanded financial services to rural areas and developed Bangkok as a 
regional financial centre. The plan was consisted of many policies targeting the strengthening of bank 
supervision, relaxing reserve requirements and entry barriers, and further deregulation of foreign exchange 
and capital control. The third plan (1996-1998) included the policies relating to the further deregulation of 
foreign exchange controls and relaxation of entry barriers into the domestic financial sector (Intarachote 
and Williams, 2003).   7 
Table 10 presents the regulatory situation both before and after the financial liberalisation. 
One of the effects of  financial liberalisation was that Thai banks developed new lines of 
business, in particular in the areas of investment banking and asset management. Moreover, 
domestic banks and corporations reduced their financing costs by raising relatively cheap funds 
from international financial markets. After financial liberalisation, the stock market rapidly 
boomed. In fact, between 1986 and 1993, the ratio of domestic banks’ deposits to total domestic 
financial assets declined from 70.8 percent to 36.8, while the stock market’s share increased 
from 8.6 p ercent to 51.2 percent during the same period (Intarachote and Williams, 2003). 
Because of relatively high interest rates in Thailand, BIBFs activities led to a greater influx of 
foreign capital, and such foreign capital competed with domestic banks for domestic business 
more than the Bank of Thailand expected. Moreover, liberalisation allowed commercial banks to 
focus less on lending and more on lucrative fee-based services, for example, advising, providing 
information, selling unit trusts, acting as trustees for mutual funds and bonds, as well as 
providing custodial services (Leightner and Lovell, 1998). 
An analysis based on data  for the period  of 1989-1994  suggested that Thai financial 
liberalisation had been successful despite the fact that it carried high risks which needed to be 
carefully monitored  (Leightner and Lovell, p. 129, 1998). In contrast, financial fragility 
increased from the mid-1990s because of technical regress and a declining efficiency. In fact, in 
the deregulated environment of the 1990s, profit efficiency declined at an increasing rate over 
time. On average, Thai banks lost 2.66 and 38.5 percent of potential profits to inefficiency in 
1990 and 1997, respectively (Intarachote and Williams, 2003). On the other hand, foreign banks 
performed little better with efficiency losses of 2.62 and 37.69 percent, respectively. 
3. Literature Review 
There are three strands of literature which relate to the present study: (1) those relating to 
bank efficiency which includes the methodologies of measuring bank efficiency, (2) those 
dealing with the impact of international financial integration on bank efficiency and (3) those 
studying bank efficiency in Asia including Thailand. 
3.1 Bank Efficiency 
Berger and Hamphrey (1997) surveyed 130 studies of financial institution efficiency in 21 
countries, covering various types of depository institutions including commercial banks, savings 
and loans, and credit unions –as well as insurance firms. The studies surveyed five different 
econometric techniques of measuring efficiency with an aim at summarising and critically 
reviewing empirical estimates of financial institutions efficiency. They focused on frontier 
efficiency, in other words, how close financial institutions are to a ‘best-practice’ frontier. 
Frontier analysis is a complicated way to benchmark the relative performance of production units. 
Generally, studies of frontier efficiency are based on accounting measures of costs, outputs, 
inputs, revenues, profits etc. to calculate efficiency relative to the best practice within the 
available sample because engineering information on the technology of financial institutions is 
not available. The five major different econometric techniques for estimating efficiency frontiers 
are nonparametric frontiers
7 which include, for example, (1) data envelopment analysis (DEA) 2) 
                                                  
7 DEA is a linear programming technique where the set of best-practice or frontier observations is the one 
for which no other linear combination of units has as much or more of every output (given inputs) or as   8 
free disposal hull (FDH), and parametric frontiers
8 which comprise three main approaches; (3) 
stochastic frontier approach (SFA), (4) distribution-free approach (DFA) and (5) thick frontier 
approach (TFA). They found that the various efficiency methods do not always yield consistent 
results. Results from applications of efficiency analysis suggest that deregulation of financials can 
either improve or worsen efficiency. It depends on industry conditions prior to deregulation
9 . 
Casu et al. (2004) compared parametric and non-parametric estimates of productivity changes 
in European banking between 1994 and 2000. Productivity change has been further decomposed 
into technological change, or change in best practice, and efficiency change. The findings suggest 
that productivity growth mainly came from improvements in technology and it seems unlikely 
that there was a catch-up on the part of non best-practice institutions. They also found that 
although competing  methodologies sometimes identify conflicting findings for the sources of 
productivity growth for individual years, the two approaches do not yield significantly different 
results in terms of identifying the components of productivity growth during the 1990s. Mester 
(1996) used the stochastic cost frontier approach to examine bank efficiency in the Third Federal 
Reserve District taking into account the quality and risk of bank output. The findings suggest that 
Third District banks operated at cost-efficient output levels and product mixes. However, there 
appears to be a significant level of X -inefficiency at the banks. With reference of coping with 
increased competitive pressures, inefficient banks in the Third District have more to fear from 
banks that are efficient producers than from banks that are producers with particular output level 
or product mixes. There is less cost savings advantage from changing output size or mix than 
from using inputs more cost-effectively.  
Berger et al. (2004) tested the effects of the relative health of community banks on economic 
growth. The analysis employed data between 1993 and 2000 on the economic performance and 
financial systems of 49 developed and developing countries. The study suggests that greater 
market shares and efficiency ranks of small, private, domestically owned banks facilitate better 
economic performance. The coefficients on the interaction terms between market shares and 
efficiency ranks are positive and statistically significant for both developed and developing 
countries indicating that the marginal benefits of higher shares for community banks are greater 
                                                                                                                                                    
little or less of every input (given outputs). FDH is a special case of the DEA model where the points on 
lines connecting the DEA vertices are not included in the frontier (Beger and Hamphrey, p. 5, 1997). 
8 SFA specifies a functional form for the cost, profit, or production relationship among inputs, outputs, and 
environmental factors, and allows for random error. SFA suggests a composed error model where 
inefficiencies are assumed to follow an asymmetric distribution, normally the half-normal, whereas 
random errors follow a symmetric distribution, usually the standard normal. The inefficiencies must have 
a truncated distribution because inefficiencies cannot be negative. DFA specifies a functional form for the 
frontier but separate the inefficiencies from random in a different way. DFA assumes that the efficiency of 
each firm is stable over time whereas random error tends to average out to zero over time. Unlike SFA, 
DFA has no strong assumptions relating to the specific distributions of the inefficiencies or random errors. 
Based on DFA, inefficiencies can be almost of any form of distribution, even one that is relatively close to 
symmetric as long as the inefficiencies are nonnegative. The last approach is TFA. TFA specifies form 
and assumes that deviations from predicted performance values within the highest and lowest performance 
quartiles of observations classified by size class represent random error. At the same time, deviations in 
predicted performance between the highest and lowest quartiles represent inefficiencies and random error 
exists within these quartiles (Berger and Hamphrey, 1997). 
9 For example, in many countries, deregulation led to rapid branch expansion, excessive asset growth, 
bank failures, and reduced efficiency. In fact, one of the objectives of deregulation is to improve 
efficiency, nevertheless, other objectives may intervene (Beger and Hamphrey, 1997, p. 4).   9 
when these banks are more efficient. Mahajan et al. (1996) studied evidence on the economies of 
scale, subadditivity and efficiency in U.S. multinational and domestic banking. The results 
indicate that the cost structures of multinational banks and domestic banks are different. 
Multinational banks are able to fully utilize economies of scale and have lesser diseconomies 
from joint production and lower inefficiencies than domestic banks. 
3.2 Impact of International Financial Integration on Bank Efficiency. 
With reference to the impact of financial liberalisation on performance of financial 
institutions, Fohlin (2000) studied the German universal banking system in the pre-WW I period 
in comparison with American and British banking systems with an objective of examining 
whether universality
10 affects banking industry concentration, levels of market power, or the 
financial performance of banks. The empirical results suggest that universality is not linked with 
superior profitability, whether the hypothesised source is efficiency (economies of scope) or 
monopoly power. 
Claessens, Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2001) found that foreign banks achieve higher 
profits than domestic banks in developing countries, while the reverse is true in developed 
countries. The differences of financial conditions between foreign and domestic banks  are 
attributed to differences in customer base, bank procedures, regulatory and tax regimes. Crystal 
et al (2001) suggested that foreign ownership may provide important positive effects on the 
stability and development of emerging market banking systems. Majnoni et al (2003) indicated 
that in the case of Hungary foreign banks are more successful in product innovation, offer a 
broader range of financial services and have better screening and monitoring procedures than 
domestic banks. Clarke et al (2001) suggested that if foreign bank entry is broad enough to exert 
competitive pressure on domestic banks, this will benefit consumers. On the other hand, foreign 
banks could be a source of financial instabilities in developing countries if they decrease their 
exposures to those countries during crisis times. Claessens and Laeven (2003) found that greater 
foreign bank presence and fewer activity restrictions in the banking sector can lead to more 
competition in banking systems. Based on data for the post-deregulation in Australia during the 
period 1988-2001, Sturm and Williams (2004) found that foreign banks were more efficient than 
domestic banks but the higher efficiency did not imply higher foreign bank profit. Bank 
efficiency has significantly increased during the post-deregulation. Interestingly, diversity in the 
types of banks was found to be an important source of improvements in productivity. 
Detragiache and Gupta (2004) argued that even subsidiaries of foreign banks were not 
necessarily invulnerable to the financial crises which struck in many emerging countries in 1997. 
As far as the link of foreign bank presence, domestic bank performance and financial 
development is concerned, there are both positive and negative impacts of foreign bank 
participation on the domestic banking industry and economy (Claessens, Demirguc-Kunt and 
Huizinga, 2000, 2001, Mishkin: 2000, Goldberg, Deges and Kinney, 1999, 2000, and Sabi, 
1996). For example, foreign banks in Hungary are more profitable than domestic banks and did 
not expose themselves to a greater liquidity or credit risk. They provided less consumer loans 
and were reluctant to give long-term loans (Sabi, 1996). More multinational bank entry caused a 
                                                  
10 Universality is the combination of commercial and investment banking services. Germany has been one 
of the first and most enthusiastic developers of large scale, joint-stock, mixed banks. In the decades 
leading up to WW I, the British financial system was the most specialised. On the other hand, at the start 
of the 20
th century, the American banks were quasi-universal, because most significant investment houses 
maintained commercial bank affiliates, usually as subsidiaries (Fohlin, 2000).   10 
lower total credit supply in the Polish economy during the early transition phase, which led to 
adverse effects on business investment (Weller, 1999). In fact, the consequences of deregulation 
can be different across countries. It depends on industry conditions prior to deregulation, for 
example, competition to pay higher deposit interest rates in the U.S., a need to rapidly expand 
market share in Spain and existing excess loan demand in Norway.  
3.3 Asian Studies on Bank Efficiency  
Kwan (2003) examined the banking industry’s per unit operating costs in seven Asian 
economies, comprising Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea 
and Thailand. The study is based on commercial banks which are listed in the IBCA bank credit 
rating agencies Bankscope database
11 between 1992 and 1999. The study shows that the country 
ranking of per unit labour costs and the country ranking of per unit physical capital costs are 
highly related. Banks with high labour costs also faced high capital cost. There are systematic 
differences in bank operating efficiency across these Asian countries; however, bank operating 
efficiency seems to be unrelated to the degree of openness of the banking sector. The study also 
finds that bank operating costs among these Asian countries declined between 1992 and 1997, 
suggesting that on average banks improved their operating performance over time. In 1997, the 
banks increased per unit operating costs when they dealt with their problem loans while output 
decreased. Between 1997 and 1999, the labour cost shares of the banks significantly declined but 
physical capital input was less flexible. Importantly, significant differences in the l abour cost 
share are found across countries indicating that different countries have different bank 
production functions. 
Mori and Tsutsui (1993) investigated the industrial organisational features of the financial 
markets in Thailand and their role in economic development and examined whether or not the 
market-structure-performance hypothesis is valid by estimating profit and cost functions. The 
study is based on pooled data from 1983-1987 of the commercial banks, finance companies, the 
securities companies and the mortgage credit companies which constituted the main part of the 
private financial intermediaries in Thailand. The findings are as follows: the expense rate of the 
commercial banks between 1983 and 1987 in Thailand was considerably higher than that of 
Japanese banks; however, their profit rate was not much higher and the real cost of funds was 
not so different. The market concentration in Thailand was higher than that in Japan. Economies 
of scale for both commercial banks and other financial institutions in Thailand were not found. 
For the commercial banks in Thailand, the effect of higher concentration on profits was positive. 
The oligopoly market structure of the commercial banks seemed to cause wasteful expenditure 
of banks. The policy implication from the findings is that it seems desirable to encourage new 
entry and limit the size of large banks in order to reduce their market power.  
Leightner and Lovell (1998) constructed Malmquist growth indexes and productivity 
indexes for two different specifications of banks’ objectives: commercial banks objective 
(profit–orientation, i.e. maximizing net interest income and non-interest income) and Bank of 
Thailand’s objective (fostering economic growth by maximising credits granted and investments 
in securities). The findings are as follows: 1) under the right conditions, financial liberalisation 
can contribute to growth in banks’ ability to increase their profits and in their ability to finance 
economic growth. 2) With reference to BOT objectives, the average bank experienced rapid 
                                                  
11 Bankscope does not include foreign branches and agencies that are wholly owned by foreign banks. 
Consequently, most of the sample banks are locally owned. However, the ownership status somehow does 
not clear-cut because it is possible for foreigners to own stocks of local banks (Kwan, 2003, pp. 474).   11 
growth relative to the previous year’s best practice; however, the average Thai bank experienced 
falling total factor productivity growth (TFP) while the average foreign bank experienced raising 
TFP. 3) No matter what performance index is used or whether commercial bank or BOT 
objectives are used, the performance of foreign small banks improved more than other bank 
categories. Importantly, strong growth should not be always accepted as good. In contrast, 
regulators should keep careful watch in order to prevent rapid growth based on speculation.  
Menkhoff (1999) studied bad banking in Thailand with an empirical analysis of macro 
indicators, revealing that long-term performance of Thailand’s financial system is reasonable 
compared to other countries’ experience. Nevertheless, the rapid liberalisation process resulted 
in severe problems of financial institutions; for example, it increased new kinds of credit risk and 
market risk. Consequently, formerly good banking practices became inadequate banking. 
Menkhoff and Chodechai (2003) analysed 560 credit files in the pre-crisis period (1992-1996) 
from Thai commercial banks. The study reveals that the structure in lending determinants is 
similar to those found in mature markets. The rationale of Thai commercial banks’ lending was 
reasonable, and does not comply easily with the frequent belief that these banks played a major 
role in the crisis in the late 1990s.  
With reference to the impact of foreign bank entry on the domestic banking sector, 
Herberholz (2002) found that foreign bank entry led to greater efficiency in the Thai domestic 
commercial banking sector. The narrowing of net interest margins suggests greater competition 
which provided welfare gains for both depositors and borrowers. The concomitant decline in 
profitability of domestic banks illustrates a decrease in excessive profits arising from oligopoly 
markets. However, an increase in cost margins (overhead expenses over total assets) seems to 
reflect rationalisation and restructuring efforts due to pressure from foreign bank entry. 
Interestingly, unlike what was found for other developing countries, foreign bank entry through 
the acquisition of locally incorporated banks had a stronger effect on the efficiency of the 
domestic commercial banking system in Thailand than had entry through the establishment of 
branches. Based on qualitative information, Intarachote and Williams (2003) found that foreign 
banks introduced due diligence and the monitoring, evaluating and disclosing of credit risks. 
This implies that foreign banks use their superior management skills and culture, while domestic 
banks are based on a learning-by-doing process. 
 
4. Data and Methodology 
4.1 Data and Descriptive Analysis 
4.1.1 Data 
The use of panel data provides many benefits for econometric estimation, for example, in 
three areas: 1) identification of economic models and discriminating between competing 
economic hypotheses, 2) eliminating and decreasing estimation bias, and 3) reducing problems 
of data multi-collinearity
12. On the other hand, the special features of panel data can also create 
new and difficult econometric problems, in particular in nonlinear models (Hsiao, 1986). 
                                                  
12 Baltagi (1995) stated that there are several benefits from using panel data. These include the following: 
(1) Panel data suggest that individuals, firms, states or countries are heterogeneous. (2) Panel data gives 
more informative data, more variability, less collinearity among the variables, more degrees of freedom 
and more efficiency. (3) Panel data are better to study the dynamics of adjustment. (4) Panel data are   12 
This study includes two types of data. The first data set which is used for the descriptive 
analysis is at an aggregate level covering 17 years between 1987 and 2003. It comes from the 
databank of financial institutions compiled by the Data Management Group, Bank of Thailand. 
The second data set is bank level panel data of income statements and balance sheets of domestic 
and foreign banks in Thailand covering 9 years between 1995 and 2003 for  the regression 
analysis. The bank level panel data set covers 23 out of a total of 31 commercial banks as of 
December 2003 which accounted for almost 90 percent of total assets of banking systems. It 
excludes Japanese banks and  other foreign banks  because their annual reports are released in 
March and November respectively. The banks can be classified into three groups; nine domestic 
banks (representing both local private and state-owned banks), four joint venture banks 
(representing banks with more than 50 per cent of foreign ownership since the acquisitions by 
foreign banks in 1999
13) and ten full branches of foreign banks (representing banks with 100 per 
cent of foreign ownership). The bank level panel data are based on financial data from the Stock 











                                                                                                                                                    
better to measure effects that cannot simply capture in pure cross-sections or pure time-series data. (5) 
Panel data models allow us to construct and test more complicated behavioural models than purely cross-
section or time-series data. (6) Panel data are normally gathered on micro units, like individuals, firms and 
households and many variables can be more accurately measured at the micro level. However, there still 
have some limitations of panel data which include design and data collection problem, distortions of 
measurement errors, selectivity problems and short time-series dimension 
13 On June 27, 1997 the Government issued an Emergency Decree amending the commercial Banking Act 
B.E. 2505 (1962) (No. 2). The Emergency Decree relaxed existing restrictions on the foreign ownership of 
commercial banks by allowing 100% shareholding for foreign investors who step in to resolve or 
rehabilitate financial institutions, subject to certain conditions. In fact, foreign investors are permitted to 
acquire a majority ownership interest in locally-incorporated financial institutions for a period of 10 years, 
following which additional shares may not be acquired until the ownership interest (both existing and new 
holdings) are maintained at 49% of total shares outstanding or less.   13 
4.1.2 Descriptive Analysis from Aggregated data 
Figures 1-4 illustrate main financial ratios relating market share and profitability of domestic 
banks
14 and foreign banks which were calculated from aggregated data (see table 11). Although 
domestic banks still held a large market share during the post-crisis period, foreign banks had 
gradually increased their market share, particularly in term of equity. As for profitability, ROA 
(after-tax income to total asset) of domestic banks experienced a net loss during 1998-2000 and 
turned to a profit during 2001-2003. On the other hand, although foreign banks experienced a 
decline in ROA during the post-crisis year, averaged ROA of foreign banks recorded positive 
figures both in the pre-crisis and post-crisis periods. The ratio of interest margin to total assets of 
domestic banks was higher than that of foreign banks in the pre-crisis period, but lower in the 
post-crisis years. 
 
Figures 1-4: Market Share and Profitability of domestic and foreign banks  
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From figures 5 -8, during the post-crisis period, domestic banks gradually decreased their 
operating costs to total assets whereas the operating costs to total assets of foreign banks slightly 
increased. The gap between labour cost to total assets of domestic and foreign banks became 
smaller during the post-crisis period. The physical capital costs to total assets of domestic banks 
were higher than that of foreign banks in most years both in the pre-crisis and post-crisis periods. 
The ratios of loans to total assets of both domestic and foreign banks moved in the same pattern. 
                                                  
14 Domestic banks include four merged banks which have more than 50% of foreign ownership. Foreign 
banks participation is greater if taking into account of four merged banks after the crisis years and foreign 
investor’s participation in large domestic banks when they increased their capital after the outbreak of the 
crisis.   14 
In fact, from  table 1 2, the ratio of loans to total assets of domestic banks decreased from an 
average of 90.55 percent during 1988-1996 to an average 65.21 percent during 1998-2003. On 
the other hand, the loan to asset ratio of foreign banks declined from an average of 91.16 percent 
to an average of 58.18 percent during the same periods. 
 
Figures 5-8: Operating Costs and loans of domestic* and foreign banks  
Between 1992 and 2003 
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4.2 Methodology 
In theory, if the objective of the firms is to maximise profits, the firms will choose the cost-
minimising production plans for every level of output. This behaviour will be observed in 
whether the firms are monopolists, perfect competitors or anything between, provided that they 
are perfectly competitive on their input markets and that therefore they face given input prices. 
There is a duality between production and cost, and as a result, we can use the cost function to 
generate a production function (Jehle and Reny, 2001). A production function is efficient when 
the maximum output is produced by each input level; in other words, the minimum level of each 
input is used for producing a given output (Maggi and Rossie, 2003). 
Although there are a huge number of studies in bank efficiency, there does not seem to be a 
general agreement on how to define inputs and outputs of multi-product financial firms
15. As a 
                                                  
15 There are five most used approaches in the researches in this area. The first is the production approach 
which defines bank activities as production of services. The second is the intermediate approach which   15 
result, the choices made by researchers should be a pragmatic compromise between the 
theoretical point of view and data availability (Maggi and Rossie, 2003). However, it should be 
noted that different efficiency concepts suggest that each concept measures a different type of 
optimisation. At the same time, the choices concerning measurement technique, functional form, 
and other variables normally provide very little differences in either average industry efficiency 
or the ranking of individual firms in the data set (Berger and Mester, 1997). 
In this paper, there are three sets of concerns: the first is to compare the banking production 
costs between different bank types in Thailand, the second is to explore the choice of input mix 
in bank cost function and the third is the effects of foreign bank entry on cost efficiency in the 
Thai banking industry. Similar to Kwan’s paper (2003), total operating costs consist of labour 
costs, physical capital costs and other costs and exclude the funding cost component which is 
assumed to significantly depend on domestic interest rates. The per unit cost measure can be 
constructed in two ways; total operating cost to total assets according to the asset approach of the 
banking output concept, and total operating cost to the sum of total assets and total deposits in 
line with the intermediation approach.  
4.2.1 Cost Efficiency 
I employ the translog cost function specification which is similar to the methodology used 
by Kwan (2003). In fact, the translog cost function is one of the most used functional forms in 
the empirical studies on bank efficiency (Maggi and Rossie, 2003). Cost efficiency provides a 
measure of how close a bank’s cost is to best practice for producing the same output bundle 
under the same conditions. In other words, efficiency is defined relative to the best practice 
observed in the industry, rather than to any true minimum costs since the underlying technology 
is unknown (Berger and Mester, 1997 and Berger et al, 2004).The inefficiency which may cause 
costs higher than the best-practice level and random terms,  ucand  ec , are assumed to be 
multiplicatively separated from the rest of the cost function as follows: 
ec   ln u   c   ln     v)   z,   y,   (w,   f      C   ln + + =                                                          (1) 
where f  denotes a functional form
16. The  uc   ln term is a factor that represents a bank’s 
inefficiency and  e c   ln is a random error which incorporates both measurement error and luck. 
The cost function is estimated using the ( uc   ln + ec   ln ) as a composite error term (Berger et al., 
2004). 
                                                                                                                                                    
defines banks as financial intermediaries that purchase input in order to generate earning assets. The third 
is asset approach which is a variant of the intermediation approach and defines liabilities as inputs and 
assets as output. The fourth is the value added approach which views any balance sheet item as output if it 
absorbs a relevant share of capital and labour. Otherwise it is treated as an input or non relevant output. 
The Fifth is the user cost approach which states that the net contribution to the bank revenue that explains 
inputs and output (Maggi and Rossie, 2003). 
16 C measures variable costs, w is the vector of prices of variable inputs, y is the vector of quantities of 
variable outputs, z represents the quantities of any fixed netputs (inputs or outputs), v is a set of 
environmental or market variables which may affect performance, uc  shows an inefficiency factor which 
may raise costs higher than the best-practice level and  ec presents the random error (Berger and Mester, 
1997, p. 3-4).   16 
Although the standard estimation method in empirical bank studies is the pooled ordinary 
least squares (OLS) method, this method raises a problem of interpretation if bank-specific 
characteristics, such as bank management which affects performance, are not considered (Jeon 
and Miller, 2004). In order to minimise the fundamental statistical problem arising from any 
omitted variables which are correlated with the included explanatory variables, one of three 
methods
17 when panel data are available is that of using dummy variables to capture the effects 
of time-invariant variables such as an individual -firm management and/or individual -invariant 
variables such as prices and interest rates. The pooled OLS estimate is generally consistent, 
although it is inefficient because it does not incorporate any prior knowledge about the form of 
serial correlation (Johnston and Dinardo, 1997). In contrast, the coefficients produced by the 
fixed-effects model (or also called least-squares dummy-variable approach) remain unbiased and 
consistent (Johnston and Dinardo, 1997, Hsiao, 1986). In response to these arguments, I tested 
both pooled OLS and fixed effects and between regressions. The paper presents the results from 
the pooled regressions which rendered better results. 
I specify the widely used translog functional form to estimate whether production costs vary 
systematically across banks and over time:  
Panel A: Domestic, Merged and Foreign Banks 
) ( ....      .   ln jt     DCt *   MERGED 3     DCt * FOREIGN   2 t DC 1 MERGED                  
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Panel B: Domestic and Merged Banks (Foreign Bank Entry Effects on Cost Efficiency) 
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It is should be noted that dummy variables for the ownership and time effect capture lnuc. 
where ln C jt is the natural logarithm of the dependent variable of observed cost over total 
assets for the jth bank at year t; three separate equations are estimated with total operating costs, 
labour costs and physical capital costs as dependent variables, respectively. 
      ln X jtis the vector of the natural logarithm of the independent variables; it includes cash 
and inter-bank/total assets,  loan loss provisions/total loans
18, equity capital /total assets 
loans/total assets and other earning assets
19/total assets. 
                                                  
17  The other two methods are as follows: 1) differencing the sample observations to reducing the 
individual-specific and/or time-specific effects and 2) assuming a conditional distribution of unobserved 
effects, given observed exogenous variables (Hsiao, p. 215-216, 1986). 
18 As for  X 2 loan loss provisions/total loans, I use the ratio figure of loan loss provisions/total net loans 
rather than natural log of that ratio in order to avoid of losing some observations because some 
observations are zero and negative figures. Total  loans are defined as net loans which are loans less 
allowance for possible loan loss. 
19 The other earning assets include securities purchased under resale agreements and investments in 
securities.   17 
     DOMESTIC is a dummy which takes on the value 1 if the banks are domestic banks and 0 
otherwise, MERGED is 1 if the banks are merged banks and 0 otherwise and FOREIGN is 1 if the 
banks are foreign banks and 0 otherwise. DOMESTIC is excluded as the reference category. 
     DOMESTIC*independent variables and  FOREIGN*independent variables are the 
interaction terms between domestic and foreign banks and independent variables respectively. 
The interaction terms allow for different slope coefficients across different types of banks or in 
other words, they allow for bank-specific characteristics such as bank management styles. 
     DC is a time specific dummy variable for the financial crisis (DC =1 if period >= 1998 
and  DC = 0 if period <= 1997). I also tested for regressions which include yearly dummy 
variables; however, most of those coefficients were insignificant. 
     FOREIGN*DC and  MERGED*DC are the interaction terms between foreign banks and 
post-crisis periods and merged banks and post-crisis periods, respectively. 
     acquiredyr is a time specific dummy variable for the period of foreign bank entry through 
acquisitions after the crisis (acquiredyr=1 if period >= 2000 and acquiredyr = 0 if period <= 
1999).  
     MERGED*acquiredyr is the interaction term between merged banks and the foreign bank 
acquisition year. 
      a ,b , g and d are the vectors of regression coefficients; and e jt is the error term. 
The ratio of cash and inter-bank to total assets (X1) captures the liquidity of the banks. 
Although liquid assets reduce the bank’s liquidity risk, they seem more costly to manage since 
these assets involve additional transportation cost, storage and protection costs and labour cost. 
Consequently, the coefficient of the cash ratio is expected to be positive. The ratio of loan loss 
provision to total loans ( X 2) controls for output quality. The coefficient of the ratio of loan loss 
provisions can be either negative or positive. If banks spend more of their resources on credit 
underwriting and loan monitoring, they would have less loan loss provisions. Then, the 
coefficient would be negative. However, if loan quality is endogenous in the quality 
management, an efficient bank with low o perating costs would have less problem loans and 
consequently, less loans loss provisions. Thus, the coefficient would be positive. The ratio of 
equity capital to total assets ( X 3) represents the  quality of bank management and risk 
preference. Banks which have high equity capital, indicating both high quality management and 
aversion to risk taking, are more likely to have higher cost efficiency. As a result, the coefficient 
on the equity ratio is expected to be negative. The loans to total assets (X 4 ) capture the output 
mix. Because loans seem to be more costly to produce than investment securities, the coefficient 
of loans to total assets is assumed to be positive (Kwan, 2003). One difference from Kwan’s 
work (2003) is that I propose the other earning assets to total assets (X 5) to control for output 
mix. Similar to the loan to total assets, the coefficient of the other earning assets to total assets is 
anticipated to be positive.  
There are two types of dummy variables; one is the dummy variables for the ownership and 
the second is the time specific dummy variables. The dummy variables for the ownership 
capture whether there are systematic differences in operating costs across different types of 
ownerships (domestic, merged and foreign banks). The coefficients of the dummy variables for 
the ownership capture bank specific factors which include the productivity of labour, the 
efficiency in resource utilisation and management styles. The dummy variable for domestic   18 
banks is excluded and defined as a reference category
20. The time specific dummy variables 
control whether there are systematic changes in production costs over time, particularly pre- and 
post-crisis. 
4.2.2 Choice of Input 
The second set of concerns is to investigate whether the choice of input-mix, for example, 
the mix of labour and physical capital varies systematically across banks and over time:  
 
Panel A: Domestic, Merged and Foreign Banks 
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where ln M jt is the natural logarithm of the dependent variable of observed cost for the jth 
bank at year  t; (M1  = labour cost to total operating costs,  M2 = Physical capital cost/total 
operating costs). Other variables of the right hand side of the equations 4 and 5 are the same as 
explained for equations 2 and 3. 
5. Empirical Results 
5.1 Cost efficiency 
Based on equation 2,  table 1  reports the cost efficiency of domestic and foreign banks in 
terms of total operating costs. The t-statistics are computed by using heteroscedasticity-corrected 
robust standard errors. There are two regressions; regression 1 presents the ratio of total 
operating costs/total assets and regression 2 presents the ratio of total operating costs /total assets 
plus deposits. These two ratios allow us to disregard the disparity generated by the differences in 
bank size. Similar to Kwan’s paper (2003), the results from regression 1 and 2 render almost the 
same results. Most of the coefficients have the same sign as expected from the theory. Taking 
the bank-specific characteristics such as bank management style into account by allowing for the 
different slope coefficients across types of banks, the results from regression 1 and 2 suggest that 
the operating costs of domestic banks are significantly positively related to cash and inter-bank, 
loan loss provisions and other earning assets but unrelated to equity and loans. On the other 
hands, those of foreign banks are significantly negatively related to equity and positively related 
                                                  
20 One of the bank specific dummy variables is excluded and defined as a reference category so as to be 
assure of the existence of the inverse of  ) X ´ X (
1 - matrix which is important in OLS because it is necessary 
for computing the estimator b ˆ . The det  ) X ´ X (  > 0 which means no multicollinearity between the 
explanatory variables (multicollinarity relates to the event that two or more explanatory variables are 
strongly linearly correlated). In fact,  X i  is not allowed to be an exact function of all other explanatory 
variables. If det  ) X ´ X ( = 0 (has multicollinearity), the inverse of  ) X ´ X (  is not defined. As a result, we 
cannot calculate the least squares estimator  b ˆ . 
   19 
to other earning assets but unrelated to cash and inter-bank, loan loss provisions, and loans. The 
fin dings illustrate that the production costs of domestic and foreign banks are different resulting 
from differences in business structures, management styles and customer bases (also see 
Claessens et. al, 2001). 
In fact, domestic banks concentrated on reducing liquidity risk by holding high levels of 
cash and inter-bank which led to high operating costs. Domestic banks also had high levels of  
non-performing loans (the ratio of loan loss provisions to total loans). In contrast, foreign banks 
were well-capitalised banks and more focused on the quality of bank management and risk 
aversion (the ratio of equity capital to total assets). The results highlight that foreign banks 
seemed to be more efficient than domestic banks in terms of capitalisation and lower levels of 
non-performing loans. This finding is consistent with Detragiache and Gupta (2004)’s study 
which indicates that foreign banks in Malaysia had relatively low non-performing loans; at the 
same time, profitability and capitalisation improved during the crisis. In contrast, domestic banks 
in Malaysia had experienced rapid portfolio growth before the crisis and most of them 
concentrated in property sector and the share purchase sector which experienced strong losses. 
Domestic banks concentrated on holding high levels of liquid assets, whereas foreign banks 
could receive liquidity and cash and other liquid assets from their headquarters. Interestingly, 
domestic and foreign banks had one thing in common. Their operating costs were significantly 
positively related to other earning assets, suggesting that banks engaged more in other earning 
assets which include securities purchased under resale agreements and investments in securities 
rather than concentrating in only loans. The reason for this is that after the 1997 financial crisis, 
banks faced a large amount of non performing loans, and as a result, banks moved towards other 
sources of earnings. 
The coefficients on the interaction terms of other earning assets with the ownership dummies 
show by how much the marginal effect of other earning assets on costs differs across ownership 
categories. These coefficients are significantly positive and the marginal effect of other earning 
assets on costs is  slightly  stronger for foreign than for domestic banks. To obtain  the overall 
marginal effect of other earning assets on costs for domestic banks, one has to add the 
coefficients on other earning assets (beta1) and on the interaction term (beta2). The result is 
0.1229. For foreign banks, the effect is even bigger at 0.1769. 
The dummy variables for the ownership capture whether there are systematic differences in 
operating costs across banks. Interestingly, the coefficient of merged banks is significantly 
negative, indicating that on average, the unit costs of production of merged banks are lower than 
those of domestic banks. Unexpectedly, based on the estimated coefficients of dummy variables 
for the ownership, the unit costs of production of domestic and foreign banks are 
indistinguishable. On the other hand, the unit costs of production of merged banks are lower than 
those of domestic and foreign banks. The reason for this is likely that merged banks were fully 
engaged in financial restructuring after the acquisitions by subsidiaries of foreign banks. In terms 
of bank operating efficiency, foreign banks did not outperform domestic banks. The findings 
suggest that if foreign banks represent the best-practice banks in the industry, to a large extent, 
domestic banks in Thailand have managed to catch up to the best-practice standard.  
Regarding the time effect dummy variables, the coefficients of DC (crisis year dummy 
variable) and interaction term of  FOREIGN*DC are insignificant, showing that per unit of 
production costs of both domestic and foreign banks during the post-crisis period are not 
significantly different. On the other hand, the coefficient of the interaction term MERGED*DC is 
significantly positive, illustrating that per unit of production costs of merged banks during the 
post-crisis period are higher than those of domestic and foreign banks. Possible reasons for the 
increase in operating costs of merged banks include the additional resources to operate with the   20 
massive non-performing loans at a time when the output deteriorated as well as, the financial 
restructuring in order to increase their competitiveness. 
In order to illuminate the production process, table 2 presents the cost efficiency of domestic 
and foreign banks in terms of labour costs (regressions 3 and 4) and physical capital costs 
(regressions 5 and 6). Similar to regressions 1 and 2, the results from regressions 3 and 4 and 
regressions 5 and 6 give the similar results. Regressions 3 and 4 show that per unit labour costs 
of domestic banks are statistically positively related to loans and other earning assets and those 
of foreign banks are significantly positively related to only other earning assets, illustrating that 
loans and other earning assets are labour intensive. As for the domestic banks, the estimated 
coefficient of the interaction term of DOMESTIC*loans is higher than that of DOMESTIC*other 
earning assets (the calculation method is illustrated earlier), suggesting that loans are more costly 
to produce than investment securities, a finding which confirms with Kwan’s (2003). 
Surprisingly, the marginal effects of interaction terms of DOMESTIC*other earning assets and 
FOREIGN*other earning assets are similar. One possible conclusion that can be drawn from this 
is that there are few differences between the marginal labour costs with respect to other earning 
assets of domestic and foreign banks. 
In regression 4 (higher r -square), the estimated coefficients of dummy variables for 
ownership are insignificant, indicating that on average the labour productivity of domestic, 
merged and foreign banks is indistinguishable. The coefficient of the post-crisis years is 
significantly negative, showing that per unit labour costs of domestic banks after the crisis were 
lower than those before the crisis. The evidence indicates that labour productivity in the banking 
sector in Thailand improved after the crisis, as did other Asian countries between 1992 and 1997 
as found by Kwan (2003). The improvement of cost efficiency in the banking sector in term of 
labour productivity resulted from the financial restructuring which was forced upon banks by, 
the crisis, by increased competition through the acquisitions of majority stakes in locally 
incorporated banks by foreign banks, by new technology and financial innovation and at the 
same time, was speeded up during the recent IMF rescue package.  
However, from regression 4 the estimated coefficients of the interaction terms of both 
FOREIGN*DC and  MERGED*DC are significantly  negative and  positive; -0.4500+0.4091=  -
0.0409 and -0.4500+0.6880 = +0.2380, respectively. The results suggest that after the crisis, per 
unit labour costs of foreign banks were lower than those of domestic banks. On the other hand, 
per unit labour costs of merged banks were higher than those of domestic banks. One reason is 
that merged banks had major downsizing and reorganisation in the early phase of acquisitions 
which incurred high costs, in particular the early retirement schemes. At the same time, after 
reorganisation, merged banks, like other foreign banks hired more high skilled labour with 
higher pay, compared with that of domestic banks. 
The physical capital cost regressions (regressions 5 and 6) render generally similar results as 
the total operating cost regressions (regressions 1 and 2). In contrast, Kwan (2003) found that the 
labour cost regressions provide generally similar results to the total cost regressions. From 
regression 5 with higher r -square, per unit physical capital costs of domestic banks are 
statistically positively related to cash and inter-bank, loan loss provisions, loans and other 
earning assets whereas those of foreign banks are significantly positively related to only cash 
and inter-bank and other earning assets. Surprisingly, the coefficients on the interaction terms of 
other earning assets with the ownership dummies are positively significant. The marginal effect 
of other earning assets on physical capital costs of foreign banks (0.3080) is stronger than that of 
domestic banks (0.1704),  indicating that foreign banks utilised more physical capital  in 
managing resale agreements and investments securities than domestic banks. As expected, the 
marginal effects of loans on physical capital costs of foreign banks (0.2723) is lower than those   21 
of domestic banks (0.7268), suggesting that foreign banks are more efficient in managing loans 
than domestic banks, which may result from either better monitoring systems and risk 
managements or better loan quality. 
From regression 5, the estimated coefficient for merged banks is statistically negative; 
illustrating that per unit physical capital costs of merged banks were lower than those of 
domestic banks. On the other hand, per unit physical capital costs of domestic and foreign banks 
are indistinguishable. The coefficient of the post-crisis dummy is insignificant. At the same time, 
the estimated coefficient of the interaction term of  MERGED*DC is significantly positive 
(0.5113), suggesting that per unit capital costs of merged banks were higher than those of 
domestic and foreign banks. After the 1997 financial crisis, most banks embarked on 
restructuring processes which needed long term investment in physical resources. One 
explanation is that some banks introduced outsourcing for capital -intensive activities related to 
information technology, for example, information system engineering, IT infrastructure, and 
information system processing
21 (Manager, 2003). Another explanation is that an increase in 
advanced technology in banking services resulted in banks moving away from the ‘bricks and 
mortar’ concept of branch-based retail banking towards e-banking as pointed out by Herberholz 
(2002). 
5.2 Choice of input  
It is generally accepted that there is substitution between labour and capital in the production 
process in the banking industry. This section tests whether the shares of labour and physical 
capital costs vary with the cash and inter-bank to total assets (the liquidity of the banks), the loan 
loss provision to total loans (output quality), the equity capital to total assets (quality of bank 
management and risk preference), loans to total assets and the other earning assets to total assets 
(output mix).  The dummy variables for the ownership test whether there are systematic 
differences in labour and physical capital cost shares across different types of banks. The 
explanation of the variations among  banks arises from remuneration and technology 
embracement across banks. The time specific dummy variables test for systematic time effects 
on labour and physical capital shares. The dummy variable for the year 1995 is excluded and 
defined as a year reference category. This effect may come from advances in technology which 
require more advanced machines rather than labour (Kwan, 2003). 
The results from regression 7 from  table 3 estimated from equation 4 shows that the labour 
cost share of domestic banks is significantly negatively related to loan loss provisions whereas 
that of foreign banks is significantly positively related to equity. The result confirms the earlier 
finding in 5.1 that production costs of domestic and foreign banks are different. One possi ble 
interpretation is that domestic and foreign banks have different businesses structures. Another 
possible interpretation is that domestic banks used more resources in handling non-performing 
loans; in contrast, foreign banks were well-capitalised banks and were more focused on the 
quality of bank management and prudent risk management. The estimated coefficients of the 
dummy variables for the ownership are insignificant, indicating that there are no significant 
differences among the three bank groups in  terms of labour cost shares. Regarding the time 
                                                  
21 DBS Thai Dhanu bank which was acquired by DBS, Singapore in 1999 and has more 50% of foreign 
ownership, firstly introduced outsourcing. At end-2002, Kasikorn Bank (formerly named Thai Farmer 
Bank) made an biggest outsourcing deal in Thailand with IBM, in the amount of 10,000 million baht for 
10 years (Manager Magazine, 2003)   22 
effect dummy variables,  the coefficient of the post-crisis dummy is significant negative. the 
estimated coefficient of the interaction term of FOREIGN*DC is significantly negative (-0.0413), 
illustrating that the labour cost shares of domestic and foreign banks declined during the post-
crisis period and that those of foreign banks were slightly lower than those of domestic banks’. 
The regression 8 estimated from equation 4 reveals that the physical capital cost share of 
foreign banks is significantly positively related to equity and loans whereas that of domestic 
banks is unrelated to any independent variables. The estimated coefficients of the dummy 
variables for the ownership, the time effect dummy variables and interaction terms are all 
insignificant. The interpretation is that the physical capital inputs of the banks depend on banks’ 
strategies and tend to be more long-term commitments. As a result, physical capital inputs are 
less flexible, which is also cl aimed by Kwan (2003). 
5.3 Effects of Foreign Bank Entry through Acquisitions on Cost Efficiency 
This section analyses the effect of foreign bank entry on banking efficiency in Thailand after 
the significant acquisitions by foreign banks in 1999. The same methodology as in 4.2 is applied 
in this section. In contrast to 5.1 and 5.2, the data set includes only nine domestic banks 
(representing both local private and state-owned banks) and four merged banks (representing 
banks with more than 50 per cent of foreign ownership since 1999) which represent foreign bank 
entry. The sample including only domestic and merged banks after the acquisitions allows me to 
compare banks which have similar business structures and customer bases. In fact, merged banks 
operate many businesses as domestic banks do. This enabled foreign banks to greatly expand 
their presence in the retail banking market through merged banks’ branches and customer bases. 
Table 4 presents regressions 1 and 2 which are estimated from equation 3. Both regressions 
provide very similar results. The findings show that per unit production costs of domestic banks 
are positively related to cash and inter-bank, loans and other earning assets; on the other hand, 
the costs of merged banks are negatively  related to cash and inter-bank and other earning assets, 
illustrating that domestic and merged banks have similar business structures as expected. As for 
the domestic banks, loans are the most costly to handle, followed by cash and inter-bank and 
other earning assets. The estimated coefficients of the dummy variable for merged banks is 
insignificant, indicating that per unit production costs of domestic and merged banks between 
1999 and 2003 are not significantly different. Regarding the time effect dummy variables, the 
estimated coefficient of acquiredyr is significantly negative,  showing that per unit production 
costs of domestic banks after the acquisition year declined. The findings suggest that the cost 
efficiency of domestic banks improved, resulting from the foreign bank entry through 
acquisitions. 
Table 5 shows the cost efficiency of domestic and merged banks in terms of labour costs 
(regression 3 and 4) and physical capital costs (regression 5 and 6). Regression 4 with higher r-
square reveals that per unit labour costs of domestic banks are statistically positively related to 
cash and inter-bank, loan and other earning assets, whereas those of merged banks are 
statistically  positively  related to equity and  negatively related to  other earning assets. 
Interestingly, the findings illustrate that since the 1999 acquisition year merged banks focused on 
equity or quality of bank management and risk management in line with mother companies’ 
directions. The estimated coefficients of merged, acquiredyr and of the interaction term of 
MERGED*acquiredyr are all insignificant, suggesting that the labour productivity of domestic 
and merged banks is indistinguishable during the period 1999-2003. 
Regressions 5 and 6 shows that the per unit of physical capital costs of both domestic and 
merged banks have the same pattern. In fact, these costs are related to cash and inter bank, loans   23 
and other earning assets. Interestingly, the physical capital cost regressions give broadly similar 
results as those of the total operating costs regression. The estimated coefficient of merged is 
significantly negative, suggesting that per unit of physical capital costs of merged banks are 
lower than those of domestic banks, in other words, the capital productivity of merged banks is 
higher than that of domestic banks. 
Referring to the choice of inputs, regressions 7 and 8 (table 6) are estimated from equation 5. 
Regression 7 shows that after the acquisition year (2000-2003) the labour cost share of merged 
banks is higher than that of domestic banks during the same period. In contrast, regression 8 
reveals that the physical capital cost share of domestic banks is higher than that of merged banks 
during the same period. The interpretation is that foreign bank entry leads to greater competition 
in the banking industry. Evidence of this is that domestic banks increased their physical capital 
costs resulting from financial restructuring in response to pressures exerted by foreign banks’ 
entry through the acquisition (see also
22 Herberholz 2002). 
6 Concluding Remarks 
Using a bank-level dataset including 23 domestic, merged and foreign banks in Thailand, 
this paper  analyses the development of per unit operating costs of the banking industry, 
compares the cost efficiency of domestic and foreign banks and examines the effect of foreign 
bank entry on banking efficiency in Thailand after the significant acquisitions by foreign banks 
after the 1997 financial crisis. Total operating costs consist of labour costs, physical capital costs 
and others and exclude the funding cost component which is assumed to significantly depend on 
domestic interest rates. The widely used translog cost functional form is used to estimate pooled 
regressions. 
The empirical findings indicate that the production costs of domestic and foreign banks are 
different, illustrating that domestic and foreign banks are different  in terms of business 
structures, management styles and customer bases.  The foreign banks seemed to be more 
efficient than domestic banks in terms of better capitalisation and lower levels of nonperforming 
loans. In contrast, domestic banks concentrated on holding high levels of liquid assets. 
Unexpectedly, the unit costs of production of domestic and foreign banks are indistinguishable. 
On the other hand, the unit costs of production of merged banks are higher than those of 
domestic and foreign banks. The reason for this is that merged banks needed additional 
resources for operating the massive non-performing loans incurred during the 1997 financial 
crisis and for financial restructuring after the acquisitions. In term of cost efficiency, foreign 
banks did not outperform domestic banks. A possible interpretation is that if foreign banks 
represent the best-practice banks in the industry, to a large extent, domestic banks in Thailand 
have managed to catch up to the best-practice standard.  
Loans are more labour intensive than  other earning assets. Surprisingly, there are fewer 
differences between the marginal labour costs with respect to other earning assets of domestic 
and foreign banks. On average the labour productivity of domestic, merged and foreign banks is 
indistinguishable.  Regarding physical capital costs, domestic banks are more efficient in 
                                                  
22 It is interesting that foreign bank entry through the acquisition of locally incorporated banks strongly 
affects on the efficiency of domestic commercial banking systems than through the establishment of 
branches. The reasons for this include as follows; (1) generally foreign bank branches in Thailand do not 
compete on a level playing field and (2) access to retail banking seems to be heavily restricted 
(Herberholz, 2002).   24 
handling  resale agreements and investments securities than foreign banks. On the other hand, 
foreign banks are more efficient in managing loans than domestic banks, a finding which may be 
due to either better monitoring systems and risk managements or better loans quality in their 
portfolios.  
Regarding the effect of foreign bank entry through acquisitions on cost efficiency, the results 
show that per unit production costs of domestic banks after the acquisition year during 2000-
2003 were lower than those of 1999. This finding suggests that the cost efficiency of domestic 
banks improved, resulting from an increase in competition arising from the foreign bank entry 
through acquisition. Since the 1999 acquisition year, merged banks focused on equity or quality 
of bank management and risk management in line with mother companies’ directions.  
Among seven countries in Asia, the observed operating costs of banks in the Philippines are 
highest, followed by South Korea, Indonesia, Thailand and Malaysia, compared to those of 
banks in Hong Kong. The unit costs of production between banks in Hong Kong and banks in 
Singapore are similar (Kwan, 2003). Combining these findings with this paper’s results, policy 
implications can be drawn as follows. One is that good management through long-term 
commitment to financial reform rather than only cost efficiency explains the survival of banks in 
the turbulent transition period in a banking sector which had to cope with the opening up of 
financial services to foreign competition (Kraft et al, 2002). The other implication as indicated in 
Detragiache and Gupta (2004) is that managerial incentives, good governance, and the quality of 
supervision at the level both of the subsidiary and of the parent banks play key roles and cannot 
be taken for granted, and that domestic banks in emerging market should aspire to achieve high 
standards in those areas. 
---------------------------------------------- 
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Table 1: Regression Results (PANEL A): The Comparison of Cost Efficiency of Domestic and 
Foreign Banks: TOTAL OPERATING COSTS
Independent Variables
Regression 1 Operating 
costs/total assets
Regression 2 Operating 
costs/total assets+deposits
parameter        t-stat parameter        t-stat
Cash and Interbank/Total Assets -0.0238 (-0.21)  -0.0382 (-0.35) 
Loan Loss Provisions/Total Loans -0.5635*** (2.94)  -0.5620*** (3.21) 
Equity/Total Assets 0.1675 (1.09)  0.2071 (1.42) 
Loans/Total Assets 0.3634** (2.12) 0.3812** (2.27)
Other Earning Assets/Total Assets -0.2809** (-2.12) -0.3216** (2.42)
DOMESTIC* Cash and Interbank/Total Assets 0.2803** (2.16)  0.2754** (2.16) 
DOMESTIC* Loan Loss Provisions/Total Loans 2.8661** (2.07)  3.1870** (2.37) 
DOMESTIC* Equity/Total Assets -0.2528 (-1.44)  -0.2976* (-1.75) 
DOMESTIC* Loans/Total Assets 0.3849 (1.55) 0.2826 (1.08)
DOMESTIC* Other Earning Assets/Total Assets 0.4182*** (2.86) 0.4445*** (3.00)
FOREIGN*Cash and Interbank/Total Assets 0.1515 (1.18) 0.1510 (1.22)
FOREIGN*Loan Loss Provisions/Total Loans 1.0818 (1.48)  1.0436 (1.39) 
FOREIGN*Equity/Total Assets -0.4938*** (-3.02)  -0.4589*** (-2.95) 
FOREIGN*Loans/Total Assets -0.1585 (-0.76)   -0.1724 (-0.85)  
FOREIGN*Other Earning Assets/Total Assets 0.4941*** (3.31)  0.4985*** (3.36) 
FOREIGN  -0.3348 (-0.77) 0.1472 (0.33)
MERGED  -1.2741* (-1.89) -1.1641* (-1.74)
DC -0.0707 (0.82)  -0.1202 (-1.34) 
FOREIGN *DC 0.1124 (0.86) 0.1207 (0.91)
MERGED *DC 0.6986*** (5.08)  0.7248*** (5.42) 
Intercept -2.9029*** (-8.79)   -3.5850*** (-10.51)  
R-squared 0.4419 0.5523
Number of Obs.                                                               200 200
Number of Banks                                                              (Number of groups) 23 23
Notes:
1) DOMESTIC Dependent variables and FOREIGN *Dependent varibles are the interaction between domestic
and all dependent variables and foreign and all dependent variables respectively.
2) FOREIGN *DC and MERGED*DC are the interaction between foreign and DC and merged and DC 
repectively.
3) The regressions are estimated by using ordinary least squared pooled cross-bank time-seris data.
4) * denotes 10% level of significance, ** denotes 5% level of significane, and *** denotes 1% level of 
significance and t-statistics which are reported in the parentheses are calculated by using
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Table 2: Regression Results (PANEL A): The Comparison of Cost Efficiency of Domestic and Foreign Banks
:LABOUR AND PHYSICAL CAPITAL COSTS
Independent Variables
Regression 3             
Labour cost/total assets
Regression 4                      
Labour cost/total 
assets+deposits
Regression 5                    
Capital cost/total assets
Regression 6                    
Capital cost/total 
assets+deposits
parameter        t-stat parameter        t-stat parameter        t-stat parameter        t-stat
Cash and Interbank/Total Assets 0.0209 (0.14)  0.0065 (0.04)  -0.0962 (-0.94)  -0.1107 (-1.13) 
Loan Loss Provisions/Total Loans -0.1188 (-0.30)  -0.1174 (0.32)  -0.4474*** (-3.36)  -0.4460*** (-3.36) 
Equity/Total Assets 0.0264 (0.14)  0.0659 (0.36)  0.0213 (0.17)  0.0609 (0.49) 
Loans/Total Assets 0.2357 (1.06) 0.2535 (1.17) 0.0172 (0.14) 0.0350 (0.29)
Other Earning Assets/Total Assets -0.1857 (-1.22) -0.2264 (-1.58) -0.2171* (-1.93) -0.2578** (-2.31)
DOMESTIC* Cash and Interbank/Total Assets 0.2343 (1.42)  0.2293 (1.45)  0.2370* (1.95)  0.2321** (1.99) 
DOMESTIC* Loan Loss Provisions/Total Loans 0.9747 (1.05)  1.2955 (1.46)  1.7091*** (2.67)  2.0299*** (3.30) 
DOMESTIC* Equity/Total Assets -0.0750 (-0.37)  -0.1199 (-0.63)  -0.0640 (-0.47)  -0.1088 (-0.82) 
DOMESTIC* Loans/Total Assets 0.5766** (2.19) 0.4743* (1.85) 0.7096*** (3.47) 0.6073*** (3.28)
DOMESTIC* Other Earning Assets/Total Assets 0.3328** (2.08) 0.3590** (2.37) 0.3875*** (2.94) 0.4138*** (3.20)
FOREIGN* Cash and Interbank/Total Assets 0.1652 (1.01) 0.1647 (1.06) 0.2467* (1.95) 0.2462** (2.03)
FOREIGN* Loan Loss Provisions/Total Loans 0.2570 (0.46)  0.2188 (0.42)  0.6587 (1.00)  0.6205 (0.99) 
FOREIGN* Equity/Total Assets -0.2109 (-1.05)  -0.1761 (-0.93)  -0.1580 (-1.01)  -0.1232 (-0.81) 
FOREIGN* Loans/Total Assets -0.1794 (-0.73)   -0.1933 (-0.82)   0.2551 (1.32)   0.2412 (1.30)  
FOREIGN* Other Earning Assets/Total Assets 0.3320** (1.96)  0.3364** (2.15)  0.5251*** (3.55)  0.5295*** (3.71) 
FOREIGN  -0.6074* (-1.69) -0.1255 (-0.37) -0.0831 (-0.15) 0.3988 (0.77)
MERGED  -1.4654* (-1.65) -1.3554 (-1.60) -1.6529*** (-2.85) -1.5428*** (-2.75)
DC -0.4005*** (-5.95)  -0.4500*** (-6.84)  -0.1105 (-1.26)  -0.1600* (-1.80) 
FOREIGN *DC 0.4009*** (3.34) 0.4091*** (3.59) -0.0171 (-0.10) -0.0089 (-0.05)
MERGED*DC 0.6618*** (3.40)  0.6880*** (3.76)  0.6218*** (4.57)  0.6480*** (4.91) 
Intercept -3.6244*** (-15.72)   -4.3066*** (-19.06)   -4.7168*** (-12.41)   -5.3990*** (-15.17)  
R-squared 0.4441 0.6175 0.3212 0.2394
Number of Obs.                                                               200 200 200 200
Number of Banks                                                              (Number of groups) 23 23 23 23
Notes:
1) DOMESTICDependent variables and FOREIGN*Dependent varibles are the interaction between domestic and all dependent variables 
and foreign and all dependent variables respectively.
2) FOREIGN*DC and MERGED *DC are the interaction between foreign and DC and merged and DC respectively.
3) The regressions are estimated by using ordinary least squared pooled cross-bank time-seris data.
4) * denotes 10% level of significance, ** denotes 5% level of significane, and *** denotes 1% level of significance and t-statistics which
are reported in the parentheses are calculated by using heteroscedasticity-corrected robust standard errors.
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Table 3: Regression Results (PANEL A) of the Labour and Physical Capital Cost Shares of 
Domestic and Foreign Banks
Independent Variables
Regression 7 Labour 
cost/total operating costs
Regression 8 Capital 
cost/total operating cost
parameter        t-stat parameter        t-stat
Cash and Interbank/Total Assets 0.0447 (0.43)  -0.0724 (-1.48) 
Loan Loss Provisions/Total Loans 0.4446* (1.69)  0.1160 (0.80) 
Equity/Total Assets -0.1411 (-1.08)  -0.1462 (-1.45) 
Loans/Total Assets -0.1277 (-0.89) -0.3462*** (-3.36)
Other Earning Assets/Total Assets 0.0952 (0.73) 0.0638 (0.95)
DOMESTIC* Cash and Interbank/Total Assets -0.0461 (-0.39)  -0.0433 (-0.50) 
DOMESTIC* Loan Loss Provisions/Total Loans -1.8915* (-1.86)  -1.1571 (-0.96) 
DOMESTIC* Equity/Total Assets 0.1778 (1.24)  0.1888 (1.55) 
DOMESTIC* Loans/Total Assets 0.1917 (0.75) 0.3247 (1.20)
DOMESTIC* Other Earning Assets/Total Assets -0.0854 (-0.59) -0.0307 (-0.31)
FOREIGN*Cash and Interbank/Total Assets 0.0137 (0.13) 0.0952 (1.08)
FOREIGN*Loan Loss Provisions/Total Loans -0.8248 (-1.25)  -0.4231 (-0.55) 
FOREIGN*Equity/Total Assets 0.2829** (2.11)  0.3357*** (2.71) 
FOREIGN*Loans/Total Assets -0.0209 (-0.13)  0.4136*** (2.61)  
FOREIGN*Other Earning Assets/Total Assets -0.1621 (-1.16)   0.0310 (0.28) 
FOREIGN  -0.2726 (-0.81) 0.2516 (0.45)
MERGED -0.1913 (-0.29) -0.3788 (-0.70)
DC -0.3298*** (-3.54)  -0.0398 (-0.46) 
FOREIGN*DC 0.2885*** (2.61) -0.1296 (-0.82)
MERGED *DC -0.0368 (-0.23)  -0.0768 (-0.64) 
Intercept -0.7216** (-2.51)   -1.8140*** (-4.28)  
R-squared 0.3398 0.2720
Number of Obs.                                                               200 200
Number of Banks                                                              (Number of groups) 23 23
Notes:
1) DOMESTIC Dependent variables and FOREIGN*Dependent varibles are the interaction between domestic
and all dependent variables and foreign and all dependent variables respectively.
2) FOREIGN *DC and MERGED *DC are the interaction between foreign and DC and merged and DC 
repectively.
3) The regressions are estimated by using ordinary least squared pooled cross-bank time-seris data.
4) * denotes 10% level of significance, ** denotes 5% level of significane, and *** denotes 1% level of 
significance and t-statistics which are reported in the parentheses are calculated by using
heteroscedasticity-corrected robust standard errors.
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Table 4: Regression Results (PANEL B): The Comparison of Cost Efficiency of Domestic and 
Merged Banks: TOTAL OPERATING COSTS
Independent Variables
Regression 1 Operating 
costs/total assets
Regression 2 Operating 
costs/total assets+deposits
parameter        t-stat parameter        t-stat
Cash and Interbank/Total Assets 0.2251*** (4.10)  0.2299*** (3.44) 
Loan Loss Provisions/Total Loans 0.4695 (0.65)  0.4985 (0.65) 
Equity/Total Assets -0.0743 (-1.31)  -0.0793 (-1.28) 
Loans/Total Assets 0.5775*** (3.15) 0.4622** (2.23)
Other Earning Assets/Total Assets 0.1962*** (2.87) 0.1756** (2.51)
MERGED*Cash and Interbank/Total Assets -0.2624* (-1.67) -0.2553* (-1.69) 
MERGED*Loan Loss Provisions/Total Loans -0.4616 (-0.54)  -0.5172 (-0.58)  
MERGED*Equity/Total Assets 0.3835 (1.25)  0.4170 (1.40) 
MERGED*Loans/Total Assets -0.1183 (-0.37)   -0.0037 (-0.01) 
MERGED*Other Earning Assets/Total Assets -0.5552*** (-3.05)  -0.5718*** (-3.28)
MERGED  -0.1683 (-0.18) -0.0563 (-0.06)
acquiredyr -0.1865** (-2.31) -0.2113*** (-2.61)
MERGED *acquiredyr -0.2009 (-0.76)  -0.1880 (-0.71) 
Constant -2.7467*** (-7.57)   -3.4930*** (-9.11)  
R-squared 0.7066 0.7106
Number of Obs.                                                               60 60
Number of Banks                                                              (Number of groups) 13 13
Notes:
1) MERGED*Dependent variables are the interaction between merged and all dependent variables.
2) The regressions are estimated by using ordinary least squared pooled cross-bank time-seris data.
3) * denotes 10% level of significance, ** denotes 5% level of significane, and *** denotes 1% level of 
significance and t-statistics which are reported in the parentheses are calculated by using
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Table 5: Regression Results (PANEL B): The Comparison of Cost Efficiency of Domestic and Merged Banks
:LABOUR AND PHYSICAL CAPITAL COSTS
Independent Variables
Regression 3             
Labour cost/total assets
Regression 4                      
Labour cost/total 
assets+deposits
Regression 5                    
Capital cost/total assets
Regression 6                    
Capital cost/total 
assets+deposits
parameter        t-stat parameter        t-stat parameter        t-stat parameter        t-stat
Cash and Interbank/Total Assets 0.2890*** (4.40)  0.2638*** (3.91)  0.2314*** (3.65)  0.2061*** (3.26) 
Loan Loss Provisions/Total Loans -0.3635 (-0.25)  -0.3345 (-0.23)  1.2211 (1.08)  1.2501 (1.13) 
Equity/Total Assets -0.0376 (-0.72)  -0.0425 (-0.76)  -0.0223 (-0.49)  -0.0272 (-0.56) 
Loans/Total Assets 0.8154*** (4.55) 0.7001*** (4.04)  0.8421*** (4.74) 0.7267*** (4.46)
Other Earning Assets/Total Assets 0.1595** (2.27) 0.1389** (2.01) 0.2240*** (2.75) 0.2035** (2.55)
MERGED* Cash and Interbank/Total Assets -0.2890 (-1.47) -0.2820 (-1.49) -0.2888* (-1.92) -0.2817* (-1.95) 
MERGED* Loan Loss Provisions/Total Loans 0.7785 (0.51)  0.7229 (0.48)   -1.4578 (-1.25)  -1.5135 (-1.32)  
MERGED* Equity/Total Assets 0.5538 (1.58)  0.5873* (1.71)  0.0433 (0.17)  0.0547 (0.19) 
MERGED* Loans/Total Assets -0.2442 (-0.67)   -0.1295 (-0.37)  -0.7364*** (-3.01)   -0.6217*** (2.75) 
MERGED* Other Earning Assets/Total Assets -0.5875** (-2.50)  -0.6040*** (-2.69) -0.4466** (-2.38)  -0.4632** (-2.54)
MERGED  -0.1281 (-0.12) -0.0161 (-0.02) -1.1565* (-1.79) -1.0445* (-1.69)
acquiredyr -0.0814 (-0.71) -0.1062 (-0.95) -0.0063 (-0.08) -0.0312 (-0.40)
MERGED*acquiredyr 0.1612 (0.62)  0.1742 (0.67)  -0.1596 (-0.67)  -0.1466 (-0.61) 
Constant -3.8011*** (-11.13)   -4.5475*** (-13.41)   -4.4013*** (-12.56)   -5.1477*** (-15.16)  
R-squared 0.6604 0.6703 0.6956 0.7020
Number of Obs.                                                               60 60 60 60
Number of Banks                                                              (Number of groups) 13 13 13 13
Notes:
1) MERGED* Dependent variables are the interaction between merged and all dependent variables.
2) The regressions are estimated by using ordinary least squared pooled cross-bank time-seris data.
3) * denotes 10% level of significance, ** denotes 5% level of significane, and *** denotes 1% level of significance and t-statistics which 
are reported in the parentheses are calculated by using heteroscedasticity-corrected robust standard errors.
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Table 6: Regression Results (PANEL B) of the Labour and Physical Capital Cost Shares of  
Domestic and Merged Banks
Independent Variables
Regression 7 Labour 
cost/total operating costs
Regression 8 Capital 
cost/total operating cost
parameter        t-stat parameter        t-stat
Cash and Interbank/Total Assets 0.0339 (0.48)  -0.0237 (-0.30) 
Loan Loss Provisions/Total Loans -0.8330 (-0.50)  0.7516 (0.75) 
Equity/Total Assets 0.0368 (0.79)  0.0520 (0.96) 
Loans/Total Assets 0.2379 (0.85) 0.2645 (0.89)
Other Earning Assets/Total Assets -0.0367 (-0.50) 0.0278 (0.33)
MERGED*Cash and Interbank/Total Assets -0.0267 (-0.29) -0.0264 (-0.28) 
MERGED*Loan Loss Provisions/Total Loans 1.2401 (0.74)  -0.9963 (-0.96)  
MERGED*Equity/Total Assets 0.1703 (1.16)  -0.3401** (-2.38) 
MERGED*Loans/Total Assets -0.1258 (-0.42)   -0.6180* (-1.93) 
MERGED*Other Earning Assets/Total Assets -0.0323 (-0.28)  0.1086 (0.97)
MERGED  0.0401 (0.06) -0.9883 (-1.51)
acquiredyr 0.1050 (0.81)  0.1801** (2.12)
MERGED *acquiredyr 0.3622** (2.28) 0.0414 (0.21) 
Constant -1.0545** (-2.49)   -1.6546*** (-3.43)  
R-squared 0.4221 0.2477
Number of Obs.                                                               60 60
Number of Banks                                                              (Number of groups) 13 13
Notes:
1) MERGED*Dependent variables are the interaction between merged and all dependent variables.
2) The regressions are estimated by using ordinary least squared pooled cross-bank time-seris data.
3) * denotes 10% level of significance, ** denotes 5% level of significane, and *** denotes 1% level of 
significance and t-statistics which are reported in the parentheses are calculated by using
heteroscedasticity-corrected robust standard errors.
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Table 7: Regression Results: The Comparison of Cost Efficiency of Domestic and Foreign Banks








Regression 3             
Labour cost/total 
assets
Regression 4                      
Labour cost/total 
assets+deposits
Regression 5                    
Capital cost/total 
assets
Regression 6                    
Capital cost/total 
assets+deposits
parameter          
t-stat
parameter           
t-stat
parameter           
t-stat
parameter          
t-stat
parameter            
t-stat
parameter           
t-stat
Cash and interbank/total assets 0.1357***               
(2.98)
0.1163***             
(2.61)
0.1496***               
(3.56)
0.1302***               
(3.26)
0.1226**              
(2.18)
0.1031*               
(1.92)
Loan Loss provisions/total net loans -0.0490              
(-0.20)
-0.0620              
(-0.24)
0.2840              
(1.23)
0.2710              
(1.19)
0.1883              
(0.70)
0.1753              
(0.67)
Equity/total assets -0.2211***               
(-3.85)
-0.1768***               
(-3.29)
-0.1355***               
(-3.14)
-0.0911**              
(-2.40)
-0.1039*              
(-1.65)
-0.0596               
(-1.01)
Loans/total assets 0.1063              
(1.18)
0.1078              
(1.25)
0.0299              
(0.35)
0.0314              
(0.41)
0.1418              
(1.38)
0.1433              
(1.49)
Other earning assets/total assets 0.1302***              
(2.60)
0.0986**              
(2.00)
0.1031**              
(2.01)
0.0715              
(1.50)
0.1808***              
(2.82)
0.1492**              
(2.41)
Foreign banks 0.5192***              
(4.59)
0.8311***              
(8.12)
0.3930***              
(3.99)
0.7049***              
(8.26)
-0.0603              
(-0.48)
0.2516**              
(2.15)
Merged banks 0.3704***              
(5.86)
0.3703***              
(5.98)
0.3965***              
(6.11)
0.3963***              
(6.31)
0.4280***              
(6.46)
0.4279***              
(6.55)
1996 (tdd2) 0.0794             
(0.87)
0.0808              
(0.90)
0.0658              
(0.69)
0.0673              
(0.76)
0.1239              
(1.16)
0.1253              
(1.17)
1997 (tdd3) 0.1503              
(1.61)
0.1690*              
(1.83)
-0.0694              
(-0.65)
-0.0507                
(-0.50)
-0.0156             
(-0.13)
0.0031              
(0.03)
1998 (tdd4) 0.2316*              
(1.90)
0.2381*              
(1.96)
-0.2152**              
(-2.00)
-0.2087**              
(-2.05)
-0.0811             
(-0.63)
-0.0746              
(-0.58)
1999 (tdd5) 0.1941*             
(1.80)
0.1756*              
(1.65)
-0.1409              
(-1.28)
-0.1593              
(-1.55)
0.0640              
(0.51)
0.0455              
(0.37)
2000 (tdd6) 0.0905              
(0.84)
0.0733             
(0.68)
-0.2057*             
(-1.78)
-0.2229**              
(-2.04)
0.0547              
(0.33)
0.0375              
(0.23)
2001 (tdd7) 0.0515             
(0.50)
0.0355             
(0.35)
-0.1964*             
(-1.82)
-0.2124**              
(-2.10)
-0.0812              
(-0.57)
-0.0972             
(-0.69)
2002 (tdd8) 0.0129              
(0.11)
-0.0075              
(-0.06)
-0.2078*              
(-1.86)
-0.2282**             
(-2.15)
-0.1204              
(-0.93)
-0.1410              
(-1.09)
2003 (tdd9) -0.0483              
(-0.39)
-0.0773              
(-0.65)
-0.1850              
(-1.47)
-0.2139*              
(-1.84)
-0.0746              
(-0.54)
-0.1035             
(-0.76)
Constant -3.8909***              
(-13.53)
-4.4542***              
(-15.62)
-4.6287***              
(-18.09)
-5.1919***              
(-21.72)
-5.1495***              
(-14.67)
-5.7128***              
(-16.57)
R-squared 0.3438 0.4954 0.2704 0.5057 0.2630 0.1780
Number of Obs. 200 200 200 200 200 200
Note:
1) The regression is estimated using Ordinary Least Squared pooled cross-bank time-series data.  
2) * denotes 10% level of significance, ** denotes 5% level of significane, and *** denotes 1% 
level of significance.
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Table 8  : Regression Results: The Comparison of Cost Efficiency of  
Domestic and Foreign Banks: Pooled Regression (according to Kwan's estimations)
Independent Variables
Regression 7 Labour 
cost/total operating costs
Regression 8 Capital 
cost/total operating cost
parameter        t-stat parameter        t-stat
Cash and interbank/total assets 0.0139                                  
(0.55)
-0.0132                                        
(-0.25)
Loan Loss provisions/total net loans 0.3330                              
(1.08)
0.2373                               
(1.05)
Equity/total assets 0.0856***                          
(2.70)
0.1172**                             
(2.01)
Loans/total assets -0.0764*                                    
(-1.71)
0.0355                                     
(0.38)
Other earning assets/total assets -0.0271                                    
(-0.89)
0.0506                                   
(0.95)
Foreign banks -0.1262**                               
(-2.06)
-0.5795***                                 
(-5.64)
Merged banks 0.0260                              
(0.65)
0.0576                               
(1.18)
1996 (tdd2) -0.0136                                       
(-0.32)
0.0445                              
(0.63)
1997 (tdd3) -0.2197***                            
(3.73)
-0.1659**                                 
(-2.02)
1998 (tdd4) -0.4468***                               
(-6.05)
-0.3126***                                      
(-3.18)
1999 (tdd5) -0.3350***                                    
(-4.46)
-0.1301                                        
(-1.36)
2000 (tdd6) -0.2962***                                     
(-4.30)
-0.0358                                     
(-0.23)
2001 (tdd7) -0.2479***                                      
(-4.10)
-0.1328                                      
(-1.16)
2002 (tdd8) -0.2207***                                     
(-3.02)
-0.1334                                     
(-1.14)
2003 (tdd9) -0.1366***                             
(-1.88)
-0.0262                                     
(-0.23)
Constant -0.7378***                                  
(-4.30)
-1.2586***                                  
(-4.09)
R-squared 0.3420 0.2837
Number of Obs. 200 200
Note:
1) The regression is estimated using Ordinary Least Squared pooled cross-bank time-series data.  
2) * denotes 10% level of significance, ** denotes 5% level of significane, and *** denotes 1% 
level of significance.
3) t-statistics which are reported in parentheses are calculated by using heteroscedasticity-
corrected robust standard errors.













Total assets         
( in bil 
Baht)





    1.1 Domestic banks 1906 13 5,780 59.40
    1.2 Foreign bank branch 1888 18 686 7.00
2. Capital markets
    2.1 SET market capitalisation 1975 n.a. 1,986 n.a.
    2.2 Public bonds outstanding 1933 n.a. 1,757 n.a.
    2.3 Corporate bonds outstanding 1992 n.a. 543 n.a.
    2.4 Securities companies  1953 39 51 0.50
    2.5 Mutual fund companies 1975 14 467 4.80
3. Special Financial Institutions (SFIs)
    3.1 Government Saving Bank 1913 1 600 6.20
    3.2 BAAC 1966 1 396 4.10
    3.3 Government Housing Bank 1953 1 362 3.70
    3.4 IFCT 1959 1 210 2.20
    3.5 Export Import Bank 1993 1 48 0.50
    3.6 SME Bank (formerly SIFC) 1992 1 13 0.10
    3.7 Secondary Mortgage Corp 1997 1 2 0.02
4. Non-bank financial intermediaries
    4.1 Finance companies 1969 19 254 2.60
    4.2 Credit foncier companies 1969 6 6 0.10
    4.3 Life insurance companies 1929 26 360 3.70
    4.4 Agricultural cooperatives 1916 4,073 67 0.70
    4.5 Non agricultural cooperatives 1937 2,333 437 4.50
Source: Disyatat and Nakornthab, 2003
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Table 10: Financial Liberalisaion and Regulatory Change, 1990-1997
Regulation Pre-liberalisation Post-liberalisation Year
A: STRUCTURE AND CONDUCT RULES
1. Entry of new banks
1.1 Thai  banks Moratorium since 1978 Permitted 1996
1.2 Foreign Banks Moratorium since 1978 Entry under BIBF license 1993
Full branch status 1996
2. Branching expansion
2.1 Thai banks 16% bond holding Abolished 1993
requirement
2.2 Foreign Banks Restricted Permitted for a sound bank 1996
3. Interest rate ceilings
3.1 Deposit rates Controlled by the BOT Free to set 1989-1992
Temporarily controlled  1997
3.2 Lending rates Controlled by the BOT Set to BOT guidelines 1/ 1992
4. Entry of new banking activities
4.1 BIBF Lincense required 1993
4.2 Credit cards Directly 1994
4.3 Underwriting and trading of  Approval required 1992
debt instruments
4.4 Mutual funds Lincense required 1992
4.5 ortfolio requirement for  Credit equal to at least 60% of  Credit equal to at least 60% of  1991
Thai banks branches deposits in each province deposits in each province
B: PRUDENTIAL AND SUPERVISORY RULES
1. Capital requirement 8% of total assets BIS standard 1993
Foreign banks tier 1 ratio to be
at least equal to 6%
2. Foreign exchange exposure 15% of tier 1 capital 
(liabilities) Reduced to 10% 1993
20% of tier 1 capital (assets) Reduced to 15% 1993
3. Provision: doubtful debt 50% of doubtful assets Increased to 100%  1994-1995
4. Reserve requirement 7% of total deposits 7% of total deposits, 7% of  1995-1996
non-resident baht account and 
7% of short-term foreign 
borrowings
A reduction from 7% to 6% for 1997
total deposits
5. Ownership of non-financial 10% of a company's shares Approval required if holding  1994
business exceeds 10%
6. Credits ratings First credit rating agency 1993
The Thai Rating & Information
Service (TRIS) started
7. Stock market regulation Securities and Exchange  1992
Commission founded.
Public companies can issue 
corporate bonds & debentures to 
general public 
Source: Intarachote and Williams, 2003
Note: 1/ Banks are advised to base their lending on the Minimum Lending Rate (MLR), Minimum Overdraft Rate 
(MOR) and Minimum Retail Rate (MRR). A maximum margin must be added to the MRR as a reference rate for 
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Table 11: Indicators of Banking Systems in Thailand





1988-90 1991-93 1994-96 Pre-crisis 1997 Post-crisis 1998-00 2001-03
Market Share (% of total)
Total assets
   Domestic Banks 95.30 94.75 90.84 93.63 80.63 88.18 87.18 89.17
   Foreign Banks 4.70 5.25 9.16 6.37 19.37 11.82 12.82 10.83
Loans
   Domestic Banks 94.96 94.68 92.50 94.05 82.52 88.77 87.82 89.72
   Foreign Banks 5.04 5.32 7.50 5.95 17.48 11.23 12.18 10.28
Cash 1/
   Domestic Banks 96.37 94.78 87.79 92.98 71.21 87.29 86.28 88.29
   Foreign Banks 3.63 5.22 12.21 7.02 28.79 12.71 13.72 11.71
Deposits
   Domestic Banks 97.85 97.88 98.27 98.00 95.68 95.14 95.48 94.79
   Foreign Banks 2.15 2.12 1.73 2.00 4.32 4.86 4.52 5.21
Equity
   Domestic Banks 88.96 89.89 78.11 85.65 31.12 48.92 41.90 55.95
   Foreign Banks 11.04 10.11 21.89 14.35 68.88 51.08 58.10 44.05
Total employment 2/
   Domestic Banks n.a. 97.84 97.60 97.72 96.75 95.78 95.91 95.66
   Foreign Banks n.a. 2.16 2.40 2.28 3.25 4.22 4.09 4.34
Profitabilty: Operating Asset Ratios (% of total avg assets)
Interest Margin
   Domestic Banks n.a. 3.62 4.20 3.91 3.60 1.36 0.86 1.86
   Foreign Banks n.a. 3.75 3.45 3.60 3.10 2.85 3.29 2.41
Non-interest income (net)
   Domestic Banks n.a. 1.06 1.31 1.19 1.35 1.00 0.91 1.10
   Foreign Banks n.a. 2.89 1.84 2.37 1.57 1.86 1.46 2.25
Gross income
   Domestic Banks n.a. 4.69 5.51 5.10 4.95 2.36 1.76 2.96
   Foreign Banks n.a. 6.64 5.30 5.97 4.67 4.71 4.75 4.66
Pre-tax income
   Domestic Banks n.a. 2.13 2.53 2.33 -1.36 -2.34 -4.88 0.21
   Foreign Banks n.a. 3.97 3.05 3.51 1.31 1.00 0.65 1.35
After-tax Income (ROA)
   Domestic Banks n.a. 1.41 1.70 1.55 -1.59 -1.68 -4.15 0.79
   Foreign Banks n.a. 2.73 2.15 2.44 0.78 0.54 0.18 0.90
Source: The author's calculation from groupped data from Data Management Group (DMG), Bank of Thailand
1/ Cash includes cash and due from financial institutions and money market.
2/ Total employment is based on the figures at end-year.
3/ Net interest income is calculated by interest income and dividend substracting with interest expenses.
4/ Gross income includes net interest income and non-interest income.
5) Domestic banks include four merged banks which have more than 50% of foreign ownership. 
6/ According to the International Loan Classification and Provision (LCP) rules and accounting standards by  
   2000. Recognition of accured interest income was shortened from 12 months to 6 months and subsequently
   3 months.  As a result, banks faced huge increases in provisioning expenses since the introduction of these 
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Table 12 : Indicators of Cost Variables in Banking Systems in Thailand






1988-90 1991-93 1994-96 Pre-crisis 1997 Post-crisis 1998-00 2001-03
Ratio of total operating costs to total assets
   Domestic Banks 1/ n.a. 2.01 2.30 2.16 2.58 2.28 2.53 2.04
   Foreign Banks n.a. 2.46 1.99 2.22 1.60 2.50 2.18 2.82
Ratios of total labour cost  2/ tototl assets
   Domestic Banks n.a. 0.93 1.03 0.98 0.91 0.67 0.70 0.65
   Foreign Banks n.a. 0.90 0.70 0.80 0.42 0.65 0.57 0.72
Ratios of total physical capital 3/ to total assets
   Domestic Banks n.a. 0.35 0.40 0.37 0.40 0.37 0.37 0.37
   Foreign Banks n.a. 0.36 0.29 0.33 0.16 0.23 0.23 0.22
Ratio of loans 4/ to total assets
   Domestic Banks 82.09 88.43 101.14 90.55 96.59 65.21 67.23 63.19
   Foreign Banks 88.23 93.76 91.49 91.16 108.77 58.18 59.57 56.79
Source: The author's calculation from groupped data from Data Management Group (DMG), Bank of Thailand
1/ Domestic banks include merged banks which were acquired by banks from developed countries in 1999.
2/ Labour cost includes salaries and employee benefits.
3/ Physical capital cost includes premises and equipments.
4/ Loans are calculated by loans plus accrued interest receivables and minus allowance for possible loan losses.
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